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ABSTRACT
As cryptocurrencies gain popularity and credibility, market-
places for cryptocurrencies are growing in importance. Un-
derstanding the dynamics of these markets can help to assess
how viable the cryptocurrnency ecosystem is and how design
choices affect market behavior. One existential threat to cryp-
tocurrencies is dramatic fluctuations in traders’ willingness to
buy or sell. Using a novel experimental methodology, we con-
ducted an online experiment to study how susceptible traders
in these markets are to peer influence from trading behav-
ior. We created bots that executed over one hundred thousand
trades costing less than a penny each in 217 cryptocurrencies
over the course of six months. We find that individual “buy”
actions led to short-term increases in subsequent buy-side ac-
tivity hundreds of times the size of our interventions. From
a design perspective, we note that the design choices of the
exchange we study may have promoted this and other peer
influence effects, which highlights the potential social and
economic impact of HCI in the design of digital institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies, a.k.a. “cryptocoins”, are rapidly gaining
popularity. The price and market cap of these assets are touch-
ing all-time highs, with billions of U.S. dollars of value per
day currently being traded in cryptocoins. Financial institu-
tions are investing in building digital currency technologies.
Blockchain-based tech startups are thriving. As these changes
in the cryptocurrency ecosystem occur, the need to understand
the market dynamics of cryptocoins increases. At the same
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time as cryptocurrencies have gained popularity, their rise has
been punctuated by crises. From the collapse of Mt. Gox
in 2014 to the 2016 hack of Etherium, market crashes have
been a regular occurrence. Understanding the dynamics of
cryptocurrency markets may allow us to anticipate and avoid
future disruptive events.
One potential threat to cryptocurrencies derives from the spec-
ulative nature of these assets. Many participants in these mar-
kets trade because they expect one or another cryptocurrency
to increase in value. Such collective excitement can lead to
bubbles and subsequent market crashes. The design choices of
the online exchanges where cryptocurrencies are traded may
also contribute to these effects if aspects of available function-
ality, graphical user interfaces (GUI), or application program-
ming interfaces (API) promote collective excitement. Markets
are human artifacts, not natural phenomena, and therefore a
target of design [53]. In the present study we strive to better
understand the factors that contribute to collective excitement
in cryptocurrencies, and how the design of cryptocurrency
market mechanisms and interfaces may affect these processes.
Central to these goals is understanding why people at a partic-
ular time decide to invest in a particular technology, product,
or idea. If the asset is new, or information about it has just
been released, investment might be a rational response to the
present state of information [9]. Other factors could include
authorities endorsing the investment, or big players making
noticeably large bets on it [8]. Another hypothesized source of
collective optimism is peer influence among small individual
traders [12, 78, 41]. Understanding these endogenous peer
influence effects is especially important. If the dynamics of
financial markets are heavily affected by small trades, different
solutions may be needed in order to stabilize the markets.
Peer influence may play a particularly large role in the cryp-
tocurrency ecosystem due to the highly speculative nature of
these assets. While in general the intrinsic value of curren-
cies increases with greater levels of adoption, here we expect
that much of the trading is speculative. As is characteristic
of many new technologies, there is a great deal of uncertainty
around which cryptocurrencies will eventually be successful,
and there has been a general feeling that some altcoin will be-
come a transformative financial technology. Many participants
in these marketplaces therefore are likely hoping to be early
investors in “the next Bitcoin”, and we can attempt to observe
the extent to which the bets of these traders may be affected
by the bets of their peers.
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There are several challenges to identifying the effects of small
individual trades in financial markets. Much of our present
knowledge about financial markets is derived from analysis
of observational data, but observational analyses are subject
to confounding interpretations. For example, excess correla-
tion in market prices is often cited as evidence against traders
engaging in the purely rational behavior predicted by the effi-
cient market hypothesis [57, 59], but these correlations could
be due to delayed reaction or overreaction to news events, as
well as perhaps due to peer influence. Experimental evidence
is desirable because of these difficulties with observational
data. Laboratory studies have been conducted in which causal
inferences can be made (e.g., [77, 2, 22, 64]), but these studies
are limited in their capacity for generalization to real financial
markets. Since markets are noisy, and the effect of individual
trades is likely to be small, a field experiment in this area
requires a large sample size, which would be expensive to
collect for scientific purposes in traditional financial markets.
We overcome these challenges using a field experiment in
an online marketplace for cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrency
markets provide a unique opportunity for field experimentation
due to their low transaction fees; low minimum orders; and
free, readily accessible public APIs. We created bots to trade
in 217 distinct altcoin markets in an online exchange called
Cryptsy. Each bot monitored a market and randomly bought
or sold the market’s associated altcoin at randomly spaced
intervals. By comparing our buy and sell interventions to
control trials we can estimate the effects that our trades had on
the dynamics of these markets. In total we conducted hundreds
of thousands tiny trades in these markets over the course of six
months, and this large sample size allows us to test the effects
that our small individual trades have in these live markets.
With an eye towards design implications, we also conduct
an enumerative analysis of the importance in this context of
Cryptsy’s design choices. We identify the position of Cryptsy
in a space of existing and potential exchange designs, and
discuss the possible effects of the dimensions of its position.
Our analysis reveals that the traders we study are susceptible
to peer influence and highlights how Cryptsy’s design choices
might have exacerbated this effect.
CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKETS
Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies are a new type of digital asset that rely on
distributed cryptographic protocols, rather than physical mate-
rial and a centralized authority, to operate as currency. Bitcoin
(BTC) was the first cryptocurrency to gain popularity, but hun-
dreds of alternative cryptocoins (called “altcoins”) have since
been introduced. The current crop of altcoins has been directly
inspired by Bitcoin, and the excitement about Bitcoin frames
the hopes and desires of participants in the marketplace for
altcoins. In discussions by those who create, promote, and
scour such coins, a desire to not miss out again on being an
early investor in the “next Bitcoin” is commonplace. However,
many altcoins represent nothing more than minor changes to
the source code of Bitcoin. While it might be tempting to
dismiss all such coins as having essentially zero probability of
success, some of them do innovate in non-technical ways. One
case is Auroracoin, which was a trivial technical modification
Figure 1: A screenshot of the Cryptsy trading platform inter-
face. Source: http://archive.is/tDFIw.
to Litecoin but was branded as the official cryptocurrency of
Iceland. Auroracoin at one point had a market cap of 500
million USD. Other coins are associated with real technical
innovations. For example, Ether is used by the Ethereum proto-
col in order to implement a fully functional distributed global
computer. Evaluating the prospective returns from investing in
any of these coins is difficult and time-consuming, requiring
expertise in both cryptography and economics.
Cryptsy
The platform we use for our experiments, Cryptsy, was a large
cryptocurrency exchange that opened on May 20, 2013 and
closed in early January 2016. At the outset of our experiment,
Cryptsy claimed over 230,000 registered users. On the last
recorded day of Cryptsy’s trading, its daily trading volume
was 106,950 USD (248 BTC), which placed it as the tenth
largest cryptocurrency exchanges by trading volume (of 675
listed) at the time. By this time Cryptsy had 541 trading pairs
(including Bitcoin, Litecoin, and fiat markets), which placed
it as the third largest exchange in terms of the total size of its
marketplace. Cryptsy was a popular exchange because of the
large number of altcoins it made available for trade, which is
also the reason it is uniquely appropriate for our experiment.
Figure 2: Descriptive statistics of the Cryptsy marketplace.
We require a popular exchange with many coins available. By
the end of 2015, Cryptsy had begun having well-publicized
issues involving users not being able to withdraw money they
had deposited on the site. On January 14, 2016 Cryptsy halted
all trading. Our experiment—spanning April 12, 2015 until
October 19, 2015—preceded the beginning of the final decline
of Cryptsy.
Market Mechanism
Cryptsy implemented a continuous double auction with an
open order book as its trading mechanism. In a continuous
double auction there is no centralized market maker. Current
asset prices are determined by the best available prices being
offered by any of the traders on the platform. A market for a
particular cryptocurrency consists of a set of open “buy orders”
and a set of open “sell orders”, all placed by peers on the site.
A buy order is a request to buy a quantity of a coin at a price
specified in the order. A sell order is a request to sell. The
current price to buy, i.e., the “buy price”, is given by the lowest
priced open sell order. The current “sell price” is given by the
highest priced open buy order. A transaction occurs when a
new buy order is placed with a price at or above the lowest
sell price, or when a new sell order is placed with a price at or
below the highest buy price. The minimum denomination on
Cryptsy was 1e-8. At a typical exchange rate of approximately
200 USD to 1 BTC during the time of our experiment, 1e-8
BTC corresponded to roughly 0.000002 USD. The minimum
total order size for a single trade varied across coins and over
time, but was typically 1e-7 BTC, and the transaction fees
were negligible.
Interfaces
Cryptsy had both a graphical user interface (GUI) and an
application programming interface (API). The GUI, pictured
in Figure 1, allowed users to browse through USD, BTC, and
Litecoin (LTC) markets. The site allowed users to view a
standalone list of all the markets, which could be sorted by
volume or price (recent price, 24-hour high price, or 24-hour
low price), and the site allowed users to view details of the
specific coin markets. All current coin prices for each of those
markets were displayed in panels on the left-hand side of the
screen in alphabetical order by the coin name. For the BTC
and LTC markets, these panels also displayed green or red
marks when the prices of each coin had recently moved up or
down. These marks accumulated during an idle web session.
The single most recent BTC and LTC market price changes
were displayed at the tops of these panels.
In addition to showing all of the open buy and sell orders,
Cryptsy also made prior transactions visible to users. Prior
transactions were shown both in a list and as a chart. The list in-
cluded the sizes, prices, and times of the last 200 transactions,
reverse ordered by time. The chart displayed an interactive
summary of prior transactions. Each “tick” on the chart vi-
sualized the highest transacted price, the lowest transacted
price, the open price, and the close price over the duration of
a certain time interval. The total traded volume over the time
duration of each tick was also shown. The time interval used
for display depended on the time granularity at which the chart
was being viewed. The chart could display the price trends
over the last 6 hours, day, week, or month, or over all time.
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 summarizes various descriptive statistics of the
Cryptsy marketplace. We observe a mean daily trading volume
of approximately 400 BTC per day on Cryptsy. This quantity
places the mean daily trading volume on Cryptsy to be at least
in the tens of thousands of USD per day during our experiment.
The mean daily trading volume remained relatively constant
over the course of our experiment, with some periods of higher
volume. There was substantial heterogeneity in the volume
of each coin. Most coins have only on the order of 10 or 100
USD being traded in their markets per day, while a few have
tens of thousands. The average size of observed trades also
varies widely across coins. Across all coins, average trade
sizes tend to be in the range of tens of cents to a few dollars.
The maximum trade size we use in our experiments of 5e-6
BTC is in the bottom 8% of the distribution of observed trade
sizes, while our minimum trade size of 5e-7 is in the bottom
1%. Using the average BTC size of trades and the average
hourly BTC volume per coin, we can also estimate the average
number of trades per hour per coin. These estimates indicate
that most coins tend have a handful of trades per hour at the
times we execute our interventions.
EXPERIMENT
Procedure
We conducted 310,222 randomly spaced trials in the Cryptsy
exchange over the course of six months. Before our experi-
ment, we purchased 0.002 BTC worth each of 217 different
altcoins available on Cryptsy. We then created bots that moni-
tored and periodically traded in each of these altcoins’ markets
in parallel. Each bot waited a random amount of time, between
one and two hours, at the beginning of the experiment before
conducting a first trade. Then, assuming there had been at
least one trade in the last hour on a coin, the bot for that coin
recorded the current market state and randomly chose to either
buy a random small amount of the coin, sell the coin, or do
nothing (as a control condition). The trade sizes were chosen
uniformly at random between 5e-7 and 5e-6 BTC. Each bot
then observed its coin’s market state at 15 minutes, 30 minutes,
Time Condition Dependent Var. n Control n Treat Control Mean Mean Effect t-stat p-value
15 Min. Buy Buy Prob. 25483 25602 0.279 0.019 4.79 2.96e-05
15 Min. Buy % Buy Vol. 24321 24313 0.290 0.017 4.40 1.97e-04
15 Min. Buy Trade Prob. 52050 51314 0.490 0.009 3.00 4.81e-02
15 Min. Sell Sell Prob. 25483 25987 0.721 -0.006 -1.44 1.00e+00
15 Min. Sell % Sell Vol. 24321 24660 0.710 -0.005 -1.31 1.00e+00
15 Min. Sell Trade Prob. 52050 51727 0.490 0.013 4.12 6.71e-04
30 Min. Buy Buy Prob. 23647 23871 0.278 0.003 0.83 1.00e+00
30 Min. Buy % Buy Vol. 23583 23802 0.291 0.005 1.33 1.00e+00
30 Min. Buy Trade Prob. 52049 51312 0.454 0.011 3.51 7.98e-03
30 Min. Sell Sell Prob. 23647 23809 0.722 0.001 0.15 1.00e+00
30 Min. Sell % Sell Vol. 23583 23735 0.709 0.002 0.58 1.00e+00
30 Min. Sell Trade Prob. 52049 51724 0.454 0.006 1.94 9.53e-01
60 Min. Buy Buy Prob. 31065 31118 0.274 0.003 0.76 1.00e+00
60 Min. Buy % Buy Vol. 30984 31044 0.289 0.001 0.33 1.00e+00
60 Min. Buy Trade Prob. 52030 51288 0.597 0.010 3.18 2.70e-02
60 Min. Sell Sell Prob. 31065 31351 0.726 0.000 0.14 1.00e+00
60 Min. Sell % Sell Vol. 30984 31275 0.711 -0.003 -1.00 1.00e+00
60 Min. Sell Trade Prob. 52030 51713 0.597 0.009 3.02 4.50e-02
Table 1: t-tests for our three main dependent variables at each monitor time associated with our interventions. All statistics were
computed on our confirmatory dataset. p-values are two-sided and Bonferroni corrected for 18 tests. We have differing numbers
of observations between our probability and percentage statistics for like conditions at identical monitor events due to differences
in sensitivity to trade execution latency in how we implemented these statistics.
Dep. Var. Independent Var. Coef. t-stat p-value
Buy Prob. Buy Treat. 0.016 4.47 1.4e-04
Buy Prob. Buy Treat.*Time 2 -0.016 -3.02 4.48e-02
Buy Prob. Buy Treat.*Time 3 -0.015 -3.15 2.92e-02
Buy Prob. Sell Treat. 0.004 1.01 1.00e+00
Buy Prob. Sell Treat.*Time 2 -0.004 -0.72 1.00e+00
Buy Prob. Sell Treat.*Time 3 -0.003 -0.61 1.00e+00
% Buy Vol. Buy Treat. 0.014 4.14 6.39e-04
% Buy Vol. Buy Treat.*Time 2 -0.012 -2.46 2.53e-01
% Buy Vol. Buy Treat.*Time 3 -0.015 -3.30 1.75e-02
% Buy Vol. Sell Treat. 0.003 0.98 1.00e+00
% Buy Vol. Sell Treat.*Time 2 -0.005 -1.03 1.00e+00
% Buy Vol. Sell Treat.*Time 3 0.001 0.21 1.00e+00
Trade Prob. Buy Treat. 0.006 2.28 4.05e-01
Trade Prob. Buy Treat.*Time 2 0.002 0.41 1.00e+00
Trade Prob. Buy Treat.*Time 3 0.000 0.08 1.00e+00
Trade Prob. Sell Treat. 0.011 4.11 7.1e-04
Trade Prob. Sell Treat.*Time 2 -0.007 -1.79 1.00e+00
Trade Prob. Sell Treat.*Time 3 -0.004 -0.98 1.00e+00
Table 2: Linear regressions for our three main dependent vari-
ables, including fixed effects for each coin, control variables
for market state, and cluster-robust standard errors. All statis-
tics were computed on our confirmatory set. p-values are two-
sided and Bonferroni corrected for 18 tests. The significant
negative effects at Time 2 and Time 3 indicate that the positive
peer influence effect of our buy interventions diminishes over
time.
and 60 minutes following the trial, after which the bot waited
a random amount of time between 0 and 60 minutes before
engaging in another trial and repeating. As a part of monitor-
ing the market state, each bot recorded the details of the most
recent trade in the market, as well as the total buy-side and
sell-side volume since the bot’s intervention. We conducted a
power analysis based on a pilot study to determine the length
of time to run our experiment.
Dependent Variables
We examine three dependent variables in our main analyses.
In order to measure peer influence on trade direction, we use
two statistics. The first statistic is the probability that the
last trade observed on a coin is a buy as opposed to a sell,
conditional on there being a trade in the observation period of
the statistic. This statistic uses the transaction type of the last
transaction that occurred in the time period associated with a
given monitor event. The statistic aggregates binary indicator
variables that check whether the last observed transaction
types were buys or sells. For this statistic, we omit monitor
events where we have not observed a trade after our own initial
trade or after the last monitor event. The second statistic is the
proportion of trading volume on the buy-side or sell-side after
our interventions. To compute this statistic, we calculate the
total volume of trades of a given coin that occurred in the time
period associated with a given monitor event, and we calculate
the fraction of that volume associated with buy or sell trades.
Once again, this statistic is undefined when there has been no
new trading activity at a given monitor event. Our statistical
tests compare the values of these statistics across the treatment
and control trials in each monitor period. Peer influence in
buying or selling would be indicated by buy treatments leading
to higher buy-side activity as measured by these statistics, or
by sell treatments leading to higher sell-side activity. A third
statistic, the probability of observing any trade at all in each
monitor period, allows us to test for peer influence in overall
trading activity in addition to trade direction. We compute
each of these statistics in three mutually exclusive periods:
in the 15 minutes after our interventions, the following 15
minutes, and the following 30 minutes.
RESULTS
Statistical Analysis
For a basic analysis, we use t-tests to compare the average
values of our dependent variables in our buy and sell trials
(a) Buy-side Interventions
(b) Sell-side Interventions
Figure 3: Bootstrap test statistic distributions for two depen-
dent variables as a function of time after our interventions.
to the average values in our control trials. The results of
these tests are given in Table 1 and visualized in Figures 3
and 4. We find significant effects of our buy interventions
on buy probability and percent buy-side volume at the 15-
minute monitor event (p < 0.001), and significant effects of
buy and sell interventions on overall trading activity at all
monitor events (p < 0.05) except the 30-minute monitor for
sell interventions.
In addition to these t-tests, we perform a more robust analy-
sis that combines the analysis of our buy and sell treatments
across monitor times, while also controlling for potential de-
pendence between observations on identical coins and poten-
tial dependence due to correlations in time. We perform linear
fixed-effects regressions that include intercepts for each coin,
and include regressor variables summarizing the market state
to control for temporal dependence in the form of spillover
effects. The variables we use to control for a coin’s market
state are: six indicator variables for whether the best buy or
sell order in the coin’s order book are above, below, or at the
coin’s last transaction price—these variables indicate how a
new trade would affect the price trend of that coin; an indicator
variable for whether the last trade before our intervention was
a buy or a sell; a continuous variable giving the percentage
of buy-side versus sell-side volume in the hour before the
intervention; and a continuous variable giving the logarithm
of the coin market volume in the hour before our intervention
divided by the average hourly volume on that coin. These
regressions also include two indicator variables for whether an
observation is associated with a buy trial or a sell trial (versus
a control trial, which is absorbed into the intercept terms), and
the regressions include interaction terms between these trial
indicators and indicator variables for each observation’s asso-
ciated monitor number. We use cluster-robust White standard
(a) Buy-side Interventions (b) Sell-side Interventions
Figure 4: Bootstrap test statistic distributions for our final
dependent variable as a function of time after our interventions.
errors [84], which adjust the model standard errors to account
for heteroskedasticity and correlation in error terms within
each altcoin’s observations. The results of these regression
are given in Table 2. These results confirm the results of our
t-tests. The effect of our buy treatments on buy trade proba-
bility and buy-side volume percentage remain significant at
the 15-minute monitor event (p < 0.001). The effect of our
buy interventions on the probability of observing a trade at
all is marginally significant, being significant at the 0.05 level
before we correct for multiple comparison but not afterwards.
The effect of our sell interventions on the probability of ob-
serving a trade at all remains significant (p < 0.001). In the
appendix we examine the randomization validity of our exper-
iment, the extent of selection bias we might have suffered, and
heterogeneity in the effects of our interventions across coins.
Peer Influence
Our results indicate strong evidence for peer influence on our
buy interventions in these markets. The probability the last
observed trade is a buy 15 minutes after a buy intervention
is 30%—an increase of 2% above the control probability of
28%. The average percentage buy-side BTC volume is 2%
higher than the 29% we observe in control trials during these
15 minute windows. Our interventions also led to overall in-
creases in trading activity. The probability of observing a trade
at all within 15 minutes after our interventions increased from
49% to approximately 50% after buy or sell interventions.
The aggregate effects of slightly higher percentages of buy-
side activity and slightly higher overall levels of trading, in
combination with a fat-tailed distribution of trading volume,
accumulate into a large 7% average increase in total buy-side
BTC volume after our buy interventions as compared to con-
trol trials (MWU-test p = 0.0011; we use an MWU-test since
the distributions are fat-tailed, MAE/MSE = 0.273 as com-
pared to 0.799 of the normal distribution). In total, we observe
approximately 16,000 USD additional buy-side trading in our
buy intervention trials as compared to the control trials. Even
though we conducted slightly fewer buy interventions than
there were control trials, the sum of all buy-side volume im-
mediately following our buy interventions was 1513 BTC, as
compared to 1430 BTC after the control trials (and 1399 after
sell trials). This difference of 83 BTC is large compared to
the total size of all of our interventions, which was approxi-
Figure 5: Plots of average hourly and daily volume.
mately 0.14 BTC. The total effects of our buy interventions
were approximately 500 times larger than their cost.
Asymmetric Null Effect
We do not observe a symmetric peer influence effect from
sell interventions. Sell interventions had no detectable effect
on the proportion of future sell-side trading. There are mul-
tiple potential causes of this asymmetry. Since we executed
roughly the same number of buy and sell interventions, and
since the dependent variables in each case have the same vari-
ance, the asymmetry cannot be due to a difference in statistical
power. Therefore the difference must be due to differences
in how the market behaves following buy versus sell events.
Notably, asymmetric peer influence effects of this sort have
been observed in online social recommendation systems in
which upvotes lead to peer influence but not downvotes [62].
However, other contextual factors could be causing the differ-
ence in our case. One possibility could be the fact that sell
actions do not decrease prices in these markets as frequently
as buy actions raise prices (sell actions only decrease prices
38% of the time, compared to the 78% of buy actions), and
hence sell treatments may not lead to the same momentum
effects. Another potential factor is that conducting a sell-side
trade requires having holdings in the asset since short-selling
was not implemented on Cryptsy. Therefore the sell effects
could be weaker due to a smaller population of peers with the
capability to sell.
Temporal Trends
The peer influence effects we observe after buy interventions
do not lead to detectable permanent shifts in market dynam-
ics. By 30 minutes after our interventions there is no longer
a detectable peer influence effect on trade direction. This di-
minishing effect over time could be due to the fact that natural
variation in subsequent trading after our interventions consists
of a mix of buying and selling, which is variance that could
dampen the effects of our buy trades. The overall excitation
effects we observe are persistent over time. The probability
of observing a trade between a half hour and an hour after
either a buy or a sell intervention remains over 1% higher than
the baseline probability in the control condition, which in this
time period is 60%.
Market Composition
The interpretation of our results depends strongly on what sorts
of participants compose the Cryptsy marketplace. If there are
many active bots, or if our interventions disproportionately
affect bots, then the implications of our experiment for the
potential effects of exchange design choices would differ. In
order to check if our results are due mainly to human activity,
we conduct a regression analysis including an independent
variable that indicates whether each intervention was executed
during the hours of the NY Stock Exchange (9am to 4pm
Eastern, Monday-Friday) and an interaction term between this
variable and the experimental condition. Here we compare
buy versus sell interventions directly, rather than each to the
control condition, to maximize our statistical power. We do
observe cyclical trends overall in average volume during U.S.
work hours, as shown in Figure 5, which indicates that the
markets likely have substantial human trading. However, our
analysis is inconclusive since we detect no significant interac-
tion in our regression. In exploratory analysis, we obtained
similarly inconclusive results using a variety of independent
variables, including holidays, weekdays, and hour of the day.
We therefore take our null result in this analysis to be weak
evidence that bots are contributing meaningfully to our results.
DISCUSSION
Mechanisms
We now discuss potential mechanisms underlying the results of
our experiment. We have limited ability to distinguish between
potential causes due to the scope our data and experiment. In
lieu of being able to provide evidence to favor one hypothesis
over another, we attempt to enumerate possible explanations.
Potential Ultimate Causes
In the analysis of our experiment we attempted to identify to
what extent our results might have been attributable to bot
trading. We have a limited ability to do so since we cannot
observe the identities of traders or which trades are executed
via the GUI versus via the API, and we know of no major
changes to the trading page interface during our experiment
that could afford quasi-experimental analysis. In any case, our
results are ultimately due to human behavior, whether:
• Direct human decision-making in GUI trading.
• Human planning, as manifest in what bots are programmed.
These two possibilities each implicate different mediating
mechanisms and moderating contextual factors.
Potential Behavioral Mechanisms
There are a few plausible simple behavioral mechanisms that
could underlie our results:
• Explicitly copying buy trades.
• Buying on an increasing price trend, i.e. momentum.
• Buying salient coins, such as coins with recent activity.
Since trade history is openly available on Cryptsy, a simple
explanation is that some fraction of traders decide to buy if
there has recently been a buy from another trader. Another pos-
sibility is that traders are paying attention to price increases,
rather than explicitly copying buy actions. Buy actions raised
the last transacted price 78% of the time during our exper-
iment. Another possibility is that people buy salient coins.
The frequent price increases from buy actions were reflected
GUI API
Bitfinex Bitstamp Cryptsy Bitfinex Bitstamp Cryptsy
Ticker chart
Prominent ticker chart
Interactive ticker chart
Order book visualization
Customizable chart colors
Audio representations of activity
Quick buy/sell buttons
Page with coin statistics compared
Active markets/price changes highlighted
Moderated forums
Coin information pages
Your trades and orders
Recent trades displayed
Live updating
Basic market summary statistics displayed
Summaries of all markets displayed on page
Market indicators available
Communication channel
Trader identities available
“Recommended coins”
Published rate limits
Table 3: Comparison of the graphical user interfaces (GUIs) and application programming interfaces (APIs) of three cryptocurrency
exchanges. Blue indicates the feature is present. Orange indicates the feature is absent. White indicates the feature is not applicable.
Bitfinex Bitstamp Cryptsy
Coins 25 5 217
Continuous double auction
Open order book
Open trade history
Spot trading
Margin trading
Short-selling
Market-making
Table 4: Comparison of cryptocurrency exchange market
mechanisms. The color code is the same as in Table 3.
in the charts that display summaries of the prices of each
coin. Peer influence from buy actions may therefore be due
to buying these salient coins. The first two mechanisms could
easily be implemented either by people directly or through
bots. The last could be implemented by bots, but would more
plausibly be implemented by people since the API does not
highlight price changes. More sophisticated mechanisms are
also a possibility if traders conduct more complex calculations
that result in individual buy trades having an overall marginal
positive peer influence effect.
Potential Moderating Contextual Factors
There are also several plausible contextual factors that might
moderate the effects we observe:
• Interface and market features
• Uncertainty of cryptocurrencies
• Aspects of the community disposition
• Size of Cryptsy
We discuss interface and market features in more detail below.
Other contextual factors that might affect the generalizability
of our results are the highly speculative nature of cryptocur-
rencies, peculiarities of the composition of traders on Cryptsy,
or the size of the Cryptsy marketplace. We expect that specu-
lation, amateur trading, and a relatively small marketplace in
which our interventions are more visible might have promoted
peer influence in our study.
Cryptocurrency Exchange Comparison
The website CryptoCoinCharts currently lists 125 online ex-
changes where bitcoins and various altcoins can be traded. In
this section we discuss common features of these exchanges as
well as other features that could plausibly be implemented in
order to explore a design space of cryptocurrency exchanges
and to provide context for our experiment. This analysis illus-
trates that the structure of Cryptsy is relatively representative
of the structure of currently popular cryptocurrency exchanges,
and provides a point of reference for a discussion of plausible
interface effects in our experiment.
We compare Cryptsy to the two highest-volume cryptocurrecy
exchanges at the time of writing: Bitfinex and Bitstamp. Ta-
bles 3 and 4 summarize key features of these exchanges. The
three exchanges are similar in many ways, but also have some
important differences. Common to all the exchanges is the
use of a continuous double auction market mechanism, open
order books and trading history, spot trading functionality,
and a prominent ticker chart visualizing recent price changes.
One notable difference in market mechanisms is that Bitfinex
implements margin trading, which allows for leveraged trades
and short-selling. Notable differences in the interfaces are that
Cryptsy did not include charts for market indicators; Bitfinex
and Bitstamp do not highlight outside market activity on an
individual coin’s trading page; and Bitstamp does not have
a communication channel for traders—Cryptsy had its own
chat room, while Bitfinex links directly to a separate site,
TradingView, from its platform. None of the exchanges im-
plemented market makers, and none of the exchanges imple-
mented common features of other types of online platforms,
such as moderated forums, information pages, deanonyimized
user activity, or recommendations.
Interface Effects
Given the design space we outlined in our comparison of
cryptocurrency exchanges, we can hypothesize about which
interface and market features might enable or promote peer
influence. The design choices of the GUI clearly could impact
human trading, and the affordances of the API clearly impact
what bots can do. GUI design choices also could influence
what types of bots people decide to implement. Every feature
we observe in the Cryptsy interfaces plausibly has either a
neutral or positive effect on peer influence, and many of these
features are shared by other exchanges. For both human and
bot traders, the features of the market mechanism and the
ready availability of recent trading activity, common to all
the exchanges we compared, is what enables peer influence
in the first place. For human traders, the prominent display
of trends in price history in the ticker chart, again a feature
common to all exchanges we compare, plausibly encourages
peer influence. More uniquely, Cryptsy’s side-panel display
of upward and downward price movements could have led to
a saliency bias [42]. The chat functionality on Cryptsy also
likely promotes peer influence, although of a different sort
than the type we studied. An important area of future work is
to more rigorously explore the causal impact of these design
features through laboratory experiments, field experiments, or
quasi-experimental observational analysis.
Generalizability
With the considerations of potential causes in mind, we ex-
pect our results to likely generalize at a minimum to other
cryptocurrency exchanges, and possibly also at least to other
online trading platforms (ZuluTrade, eToro, etc.) and other
small markets (e.g., penny stocks or pink sheets stocks). The
fact that Cryptsy highlighted price change direction in the
side-panel of its GUI is relatively unique, but other exchanges
have their own unique features that could also promote peer
influence, such as the audible beeps that occur with all trades
on Bitstamp. Generalization to larger and more professional
financial markets is an important topic. Similar effects may be
observable in higher-volume markets, but perhaps may require
larger or more sustained interventions to be detectable. Ob-
taining a more rigorous understanding of the interface effects
in these larger markets would be especially interesting.
Design Implications
In our discussion we have directed attention towards interface
features in particular as potential moderating contextual fac-
tors. We highlight the point that many of Cryptsy’s design
choices could have plausibly promoted peer influence, and
that Cryptsy could have potentially made alternative choices
that might inhibit it. There is an interesting moral hazard
implicated in these considerations. Cryptsy and other cryp-
tocurrency exchanges make more money when more people
use the platform, so they are incentivized to optimize their
sites to stimulate trading, including via peer influence. At the
same time, there are multiple factors that go into creating a sta-
ble marketplace [53]. Maintaining an awareness of incentives
and a focus on design goals could help to balance the positive
and negative systemic effects of design choices.
RELATED WORK
There are several bodies of work within computational social
science, economics and finance, and human-computer interac-
tion related to the present study. We briefly review work on
online field experiments in peer influence, peer influence in
financial markets, online collective behavior, and the design
of digital institutions.
Online Field Experiments in Peer Influence
A growing area across communities studying computational
social science is digital and online experimentation [5, 69].
Our work was directly inspired by earlier online experiments
studying peer influence in a variety of different types of on-
line social systems [37, 70, 13, 62, 80]. These experiments
have provided compelling evidence for the ubiquity of peer
influence across an array of domains, and in some cases the
importance of these effects on collective outcomes. Ours is the
first study to apply the large-scale online field experimentation
techniques innovated in these early works to online financial
markets.
Peer Influence in Financial Markets
There have been a number of observational studies, laboratory
experiments, and small-scale field experiments in finance and
economics studying peer influence in financial markets. For
instance, the widely recognized empirical phenomenon of mo-
mentum in price dynamics is related to our work. A number of
researchers have identified evidence for momentum through
observational analysis of real financial markets [75, 57, 59]
and through the implementation of momentum-based trading
strategies [46, 68, 47]. In another line of work, models of
“herding” formalize the behavior of traders copying decisions
to invest [7, 11, 4, 19]. These models have been tested directly
in stylized laboratory experiments [2, 22, 21, 25]. Herding has
been argued to occur in real markets through observational
analyses of coarse-grained market data and individual institu-
tional investor data [12, 78], but some analyses with market
data have yielded negative results [78]. The empirical work
in finance and economics most relevant to our own comes
from the literature on attempting to manipulate asset prices
in laboratory asset markets [36, 81, 82, 16] and certain types
of real markets [17, 67]. The general form of these existing
studies has been to execute large trades in the markets be-
ing studied and observe the effects on market prices over a
short time period. We focus on the effects of small individual
trades rather than attempts at market manipulation through
abnormally large actions.
Cryptocurrency Market Dynamics
A growing body of work studies the dynamics of cryptocur-
rency markets specifically. Observational data analyses, with
sometimes conflicting results, have been used to examine com-
petition between cryptocurrencies for market volume [28]; to
compute the fundamental value of cryptocurrencies [40]; to in-
vestigate the efficiency of bitcoin markets [79, 63]; to confirm
the presence of speculative behavior in bitcoin markets [58,
20]; to provide evidence for non-fundamentals-driven trading
behavior in altcoin markets [26]; and to document how factors
such as fundamental value [52, 14] or online search and dis-
cussion activity [51, 30] are related to cryptocurrency prices.
A recent study closely related in spirit to our own provided
observational evidence of market manipulation in USD-BTC
markets [29].
Studying Online Collective Behavior
Our work also builds on a growing area within the human-
computer interaction (HCI) and computer-supported coopera-
tive work (CSCW) communities involving the study of human
collective behavior in online platforms. Some of this work has
focused on financial markets [31, 85]. Peer influence is related
to the study of popularity dynamics in follower behavior (e.g.,
[43]) and online voting behavior (e.g., [56, 76, 55]). Others
have studied how design can help ameliorate the effects of
peer influence in online social recommendation systems (e.g.,
[50, 1]). Our work also employs the experimental technique
of using bots in online field experiments that has recently been
developed in these communities [72, 49].
Design of Digital Institutions
A final related area of work is the design of digital institutions.
Many traditional institutions are shifting to having digital
components, and as this shift occurs, the study of institutions
becomes more relevant to researchers in human-computer
interaction and computer-supported cooperative work. Re-
searchers have studied a variety of different types of institu-
tions, for example: payment systems [86]; economics [6] and
marriage [27] in online worlds; organizational behavior [33];
activism [72]; knowledge markets [74]; labor markets [73, 3,
48, 32], large-scale collaboration [10, 61]; money (including
cryptocurrencies) [18, 71]; personal finance [35, 34]; supply
chains [66]; entrepreneurship [45]; hospitality [54]; and envi-
ronmental sustainability [24]. Broadly, these works bring a
design lens to bear on patterns of repeated digitally mediated
large-scale social interaction, and particularly a lens for how
the structure of technological artifacts affects our interaction
patterns. Others in the community have considered ethical [44,
83, 15, 23, 38] and conceptual [60, 39] frameworks applicable
to this type of design. Specific interest in HCI-oriented finan-
cial market design has existed since the early days of online
markets. An early study investigated how market interfaces
can impact market liquidity compared to physical “trading
pits” [65]. Recent work has emphasized a view of markets
as technologically-mediated human systems, and therefore a
potentially fruitful target of HCI design and critique [53].
CONCLUSION
Institutional design is a major area of study in the social sci-
ences. The HCI community has an opportunity to contribute
to this conversation as many farflung institutions—from banks
to marriage in Second Life—migrate to digital spaces. The
methodologies for studying digital systems; the awareness of
interface effects; and the keen eyes for bias, ethics, and inclu-
sion in the HCI community could add unique perspectives to
the design of digital institutions. Markets are an example of
an enormously important institution that is becoming increas-
ingly digitized, and market irrationality may be a problem in
markets that design-thinking could help address. Our specific
application to cryptocurrencies is timely and urgent as new
platforms are growing and potentially encouraging users to
adopt risky trading strategies.
Our work provides an example of how peers in an online sys-
tem can audit the system dynamics through experimentation
with typical behavior. Bots that randomly execute actions of
normal users could provide a way to understand peer influence
and other phenomena in a variety of online systems. These
bots allow us to understand the causal impact of individual
actions that can be taken by users in these systems. In studying
the dynamics of cryptocurrency markets with this technique,
we show that even trades worth just fractions of a penny can
influence the nature of other much larger trades in the cryp-
tocurrency markets we study. We observe an approximately
two percentage point increase in buying activity after our buy
interventions, and a cumulative monetary effect of 500 times
the size of our interventions. While an increase of two per-
centage points might seem small for an individual action, in
a large marketplace this amount is non-trivial. For example,
at the time of writing Apple stock on the NASDAQ exchange
had an average daily trading volume of 30 million USD, 2%
of which would amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars
over the course of a day on that stock alone. Designers of
online markets should be aware of how minor changes in their
systems that affect individual and collective behavior could
have major social and economic impact.
APPENDIX
Supplementary Analysis
Randomization Validity
We assess the validity of our randomization procedure to check
that our treatment groups and control groups are not system-
atically different. We observe no detectable systematic differ-
ences between treatment and control groups on the dependent
variables we measure before our interventions, but we do see
significantly fewer treatment observations than expected by
chance (binomial test, n = 2 · (52056), p < 1e− 5). We at-
tribute this difference to a failure to treat, likely caused by a
bug in Cryptsy that occasionally prevented us from executing
trades. However, we find that our results are robust to simulat-
ing these failures to treat in the control condition. Plots of the
numbers of control and treatment observations reveal that no
single coin is much more unbalanced than others in terms of
the number of control versus treatment observations on that
coin.
Selection Bias
There are several potential sources of bias in our experimental
design that could have influenced our estimated effect sizes.
We only conducted interventions when the trade history and
order book were accessible via the Cryptsy API, when we had
sufficient funds to buy and sell at least 5e-6 of the coins they
were monitoring, and when at least one trade on the coin had
occurred in the last hour. The fact that we condition on having
access to the Cryptsy API, having enough coins to trade, and
having observed a trade at least an hour before our interven-
tions means that we are always conditioning on a particular,
albeit likely fairly common, market context in our experiments.
Another source of bias in two of our dependent variables is
missing trials due to having no trades observed in our monitor
windows. Both the probability that the last observed trade is
a buy and the percentage of buy-side volume are undefined
when no trades are observed. We achieved only approximately
50% overall probability of observing any trades within 15 min-
utes after our interventions, and this probability varies widely
across coins. The combined effects of these two sources of
selection bias can be observed by looking at the number of
observations we have per coin. Since higher volume coins
are likely to meet both our condition for intervention and our
condition for measurement, any bias on the marginal effects
we examine will be towards the effect on higher volume coins,
which are of more general interest anyway. Regardless, the
fixed effects regressions we performed helps to control for the
selection bias due to coin-level effects. Since our treatments af-
fect the observability of our outcome variables, we might also
be concerned that observability alone is driving our effects.
However, we see that there is a significant difference in effect
between buy and sell treatments, which do not differ strongly
in terms of observability. In this analysis, the treatment type
does not significantly interact with pre-treatment market state
variables when predicting observability and controlling for
multiple comparison in a linear regression.
Heterogeneous Effects
We observe substantial variation across coins in our dependent
variables and in the effect sizes of our interventions. However,
we did not identify any descriptive statistics of the coins that
were reliably predictive of effect size (with effect size mea-
sured by the difference between the treatment mean and the
control mean). A multivariate linear regression including me-
dian values of coin attributes (price, volume, spread, and best
open sell/buy order size) yielded no significant relationships
with effect size and low R-squared values of approximately
0.01. Since much of the variability occurs on coins with fewer
observations, the major variations across coins are therefore
likely largely due to noise. We needed a large sample size in
order to be able to detect aggregate peer influence effects in
these markets at all. We appear to have too small of a sam-
ple size per individual altcoin, and too few coins, to examine
heterogeneous treatment effects.
Code, Data, Preregistration, and Institutional Review
Our code and data, including a list of cryptocurrencies
we traded, is available online: https://github.com/pkrafft/
An-Experimental-Study-of-Cryptocurrency-Market-Dynamics.
Code for our experiment specifying the details of our experi-
mental design was preregistered.1 Our final statistical analysis
differed from our preregistered one. Before conducting
non-preregistered data analysis, we split our entire dataset of
trials uniformly at random into two halves, one for exploratory
statistical analysis and one for confirmatory statistical analysis.
The results we show are from our confirmatory validation set.
This confirmatory set was held-out from analysis as much
1https://osf.io/djezp/
possible. Our experiment was approved by the human subjects
review boards of MIT and ANU (MIT Protocol #1409006623,
ANU Protocol: 2015/652). Because our experiments were
conducted in the field and consisted of no more than regular
trading activity in the markets we used, our study posed
minimal risk to our participants and therefore was granted a
waiver of informed consent.
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